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SYMPOSIUM

Antitrust Issues In Amateur Sports t
INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST-THE
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUE
JOHN SCANLAN*

I.
Shortly after collecting her gold medals at the Los Angeles Olympics,
Mary Lou Retton flashed her breakfast cereal smile and confessed that her
greatest wish was to drive away in a brand new Corvette. This was America's
newest sweetheart speaking: role model for thousands of teenage girls propelling themselves into the air in hundreds of gymnasia scattered across
America, an athlete so photogenic and agile she put the memory of nimble
Nadia in the shade, and permitted the nation to forget-officially at leastthat Olga Korbut had ever existed. Given her exalted status, and her role
as returning hero, it was not surprising that Mary Lou's fondest wish was
granted: when she arrived back in West Virginia, the car of her dreams was
there waiting.
As lawyers, educators, athletic administrators, or broadcast representatives
we should, I think, have a particular interest in the story of Mary Lou
Retton and her car. That interest should be heightened in our present setting,
t The articles for this symposium were presented at the March 1985 Conference on
"Antitrust Issues in Amateur Sports" which was sponsored by the Center for Law and Sports
at the Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. Funding for the conference
was provided by the Eli Lilly Endowment, Inc., of Indianapolis, Indiana.
* Associate Professor of Law (part time); Director, Center for Law and Sports, Indiana
University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. A.B., 1966, Notre Dame; M.A., 1967, Univ.
of Chicago; Ph.D., 1975, Iowa; J.D., 1978, Notre Dame.
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at a conference devoted to antitrust issues in athletics, especially amateur
athletics. For the story gives us an immediate, somewhat superficial vision
of the role sports play in our society, and a means of entering the obscurer
regions of sports organization and sports economics. Both, I believe, have
considerable legal relevance.
In Olympic sports, the immediate vision focuses on the athlete in midvault, the applause and instant adulation. Athletes are honored because they
are immensely skilled, because they give us vicarious pleasure, because emotionally, physically, even politically they represent us on the field of sport.
In these terms, a Corvette is the symbolic equivalent of the laurel wreathes
which were once awarded the winners of the ancient Greek games. Both
had economic value-Athenian athletes were technically "amateurs," but
they were well fixed for life if they returned home as champions. Yet money,
commerce, and industry were all essentially irrelevant to the audience during
the moment of competition and during its immediate aftermath.
The Constitution of the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
defines an "amateur student athlete" as a person "who engages in a particular sport for the educational, physical, mental and social benefits he
derives therefrom and to whom participation in that sport is an avocation."I
That definition, tailored to the collegiate setting, endorses a view of athletics
which is very similar to the one I have been describing. Its principal distinguishing feature lies in its endorsement of the educational value of athletics.
Thus, another constitutional provision states:
The competitive athletic programs of the colleges are designed to be a
vital part of the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association
is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body
and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between college
athletics and professional sports.2
"Maintain[ing] intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program" can mean any number of things, including-but not necessarily
restricted to-a) maximizing the opportunity of students to participate in
intercollegiate competition by sponsoring numerous sports, irrespective of
the income they produce, or b) substantially integrating a school's athletic
program into its overall curriculum. Whatever its practical implications,
however, the integration of sports and education suggests that "amateurism"
has another potential dimension, best summarized by the classic phrase, "a
sound mind in a sound body." Such a dimension, the NCAA suggests, helps
to set off its program from "professional sports"-including, it is safe to
presume, its more tawdry, money-grubbing aspects.

1. N.C.A.A. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. N.C.A.A. CONST. art. II, § 2-(a).
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Yet Mary Lou Retton did not get her car merely because she can twist
herself into knots in midair, and Doug Flutie did not receive his Heisman
Trophy on live national television merely because his last-second pass in the
Miami game excited millions. Nor was television present a few weeks later
when he signed a $6 million professional contract because quarterbacking
had enhanced his skills in the classroom. In the case of both athletes, amateur
athletic performance was valued so highly, not only because of its intrinsic
physical, aesthetic, or moral appeal, but also because it had become a
commodity in some sense equivalent to Mary Lou's Wheaties, marketed in
a similar fashion, and for the same general purpose-to secure product
recognition and generate revenue. Thus, Mary Lou's car and Doug's Heisman and Jackie Sherrill's immense salary at Texas A&M all help underline
a fact that Professor Koch's fine paper will bring into sharper focus: amateur
sports in many important respects is a business, a highly specialized industry
which converts the raw material of athletic skill into a product which is customarily sold in the competitive television market.
That amateur sports is in some sense a business is of course not news.
That the Supreme Court, in its interpretation of the antitrust laws, should
explicitly treat the NCAA as a business-albeit a special sort of one-is,
however, a new development and a very noteworthy one. For in the case
of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,3 (NCAA),
the Court, for the first time, brought intercollegiate athletics-and by implication, at least-other forms of amateur sport into the regulatory mainstream, forcing athletic organizations to justify, in specifically economic
terms, conduct which has an apparent negative effect on market competition.
The Supreme Court's decision was foreshadowed by the earlier decisions of
the lower federal courts in the NCAA case. But in the main, it marked a
sharp departure from several lines of cases effectively immunizing colleges
and universities, and their athletic programs, and the activities of amateur
athletic associations and organizations from regulation under the antitrust
laws. As Ms. Kirby and Mr. Weymouth demonstrate in their comprehensive
paper, those cases had granted schools and sports organizations broad latitude in establishing and enforcing a wide variety of constraints on such
activities as the setting of minimal educational or participatory standards,
the hiring of coaches, and the marketing of broadcast and telecast rights.
The ultimate effect of the Supreme Court's decision will not, of course,
be knowable until more cases are decided. Yet it is because those results in
one area-the selling of television rights-have already been substantial, and
because the language and logic of the NCAA decision raises broad and
troubling questions about many of the other controls which colleges and
amateur athletic organizations still impose that we are meeting here at this
conference.
3. 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
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II.
The economist and the lawyers who will be speaking after me are considerably more expert in the ramifications of antitrust law than I will ever
be. From them, we will hear the details of the litigation which led to the
Supreme Court's decision, and will be given exceptional insight into the
Court's logic, its economic and social assumptions, and the probable effect
of its reasoning on the organization and conduct of amateur sports. I can
add nothing to their scholarship. But by concluding my remarks with a short
overview of the present state of the law and a short summary of some of
the questions we will be addressing, I hope I can provide some focus to our
common enterprise, and perhaps highlight some of the more important issues
we ought to discuss.
First, I believe the most important thing the NCAA case tells us is that
henceforth the courts are going to look much more closely at the economic
consequences of amateur sports organizations and of the control that universities, athletic associations, and national governing boards exert over
athletic competition and its marketing. However, a strong case can be made
for the proposition that Olympic sports, because of their special legislative
status, are unlikely to be affected as significantly as intercollegiate sports.
Yet even in the Olympic area, the virtual monopoly power that national
governing bodies have to schedule and market events, and to dictate the
terms of competition could have adverse antitrust implications.
Second, the decision in NCAA leaves considerable room for the courts to
either expand upon its rationale and coverage, or to limit the case to instances
where the regulations of organizing bodies result in clear restraints of trade.
Philip Areeda, discussing antitrust law generally, has made the following
pertinent comment:
Federal antitrust statutes are very much simpler than commercial codes
or tax statutes. The basic statute, the Sherman Act, simply condemns
(1) contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and
(2) monopolization, combinations to monopolize, or attempts to monopolize . .. IT]he prohibition of trade restraints and monopolization
is extremely vague and general. Indeed, the Sherman Act may be little
more than a legislative command that the judiciary develop a common
law of antitrust.4
The NCAA case represents one of the first stages of such common law

development as it affects the legality of restrictive practices employed by
amateur-and more specifically-intercollegiate sports organizations. There

is dicta in the case which supports the view that some regulations which
preserve the special character of the amateur sports "product" will be
regarded as permissible, even if they affect the access that athletes and
4. P.

AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES

5 (3d ed. 1981).
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institutions may have to the sports or television marketplace. Speaking specifically of "college football," for instance, the Court noted:
the NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college football. The identification of this "product" with an academic tradition
differentiates college football from and makes it more popular than
professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as,
for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character
and quality of this "product," athletes must not be paid, must be required
to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the "product" cannot
be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such
restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing
field might soon be destroyed.'
Third, despite such dicta, the dominant message of the case is that amateur
sports are a business, that the athletic contests which they generate are
"products," in essence, no different from cellophane, linoleum, or refined
oil, and that every restriction reached jointly by separate institutions (or
presumably, by sports organizations constituting a monopoly) will be measured against the single standard of enhanced competition. Thus, the Court's
apparent approval of measures designed to preserve the integrity of "college
football" is premised, not on the view that ideals of amateurism or of the
student-athlete have any value in themselves, but on the view that regulations
supporting these values help maintain the identity of a unique community.
This point can be amply illustrated by completing the quote just given:
the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its
character and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might
otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice-not only the choices available to sports fans but also those
available to athletes-and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.'
The Court, in important sections of the NCAA case, states many of its
conclusions in the economic language of consumer sovereignty. Mr. Heidt,
rightly concerned about this exclusive emphasis on "unrestricted output"
and market efficiency, raises some disturbing questions about the potential
effect of this approach on athletes subject to discipline or exclusion from
competition. The decisions he draws on are professional rather than amateur
sports cases, but the issues he presents clearly cross over into the domain
of amateur sports.
The potential legal difficulty for athletes is fairly obvious: if various
disciplinary or eligibility rules can be justified on the grounds that their
enforcement helps strengthen an identifiable "product"-intercollegiate athletics-then even though those rules may restrict the playing opportunities
for individual athletes, they will be regarded as consistent with the thrust
of the antitrust laws. On the other hand, the potential problems for colleges,
5. 104 S. Ct. at 2961.
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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universities, amateur athletic associations, and NGB's are probably at least
as great. Thus, rules that cannot under the Rule of Reason be economically
justified as procompetitive will probably be adjudged illegal, even though
they may contribute to defensible noneconomic institutional goals. One
effect of the NCAA case, for example, is that smaller colleges with athletic
programs that are not self-supporting are no longer entitled to share in
television receipts. A possible consequence may be that institutions fielding
teams that emphasize broad opportunity to compete, albeit with no particular
distinction, may be forced to discontinue all or part of their athletic programs.
Fourth, I believe that there are other lessons that the professional sports
cases can teach us. One such lesson is that many time-honored restrictive
practices, once exposed to sharp analysis under the antitrust laws, will in
fact be regarded as anticompetitive. Due in large part to a famous 1922
opinion by Justice Holmes that concluded that professional baseball was not
a "business," and therefore not subject to antitrust restrictions,7 professional
athletics for many decades remained, figuratively speaking, in their Mary
Lou Retton phase. League restrictions on the freedom of individual players
to strike their own bargains with teams willing to purchase their services
were upheld by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, as were incidental rules designed to keep under-age and other unwanted players out of
the professional draft. However, beginning in 1957, in a case attacking the
reserve clause in professional football,8 the Supreme Court began carving
away the antitrust exemption for professional sports, so that now, thanks
to stare decisis, it exists only as an anachronistic curiosity in professional
baseball. 9 With the demise of this sports exemption, professional teams and
leagues in every sport have found it virtually impossible to justify rules which
restrict the bargaining rights of present or prospective professional athletes,
or which impose artificial limits on output. Only in one area do such
restrictions appear to be clearly defensible. Thus, rules which are integral
to a sport, establishing for example the number of teams in a league, the
permissible size of each squad, and the scheduling of contests can all probably
be justified on the grounds that without such rules, an identifiable "product"-professional baseball or basketball or football-could not be said to
exist at all. This argument, which was first presented by Judge Bork in a law
review article, 0 was specifically adopted by the Court in the NCAA case.
Not specifically adopted, but almost certainly implicit in the case, is the

7. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,

259 U.S. 200 (1922).
8. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
9. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
10. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW 211 (1959).
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view that anticompetitive barriers to entry in amateur sports-such as restrictions on the maximum number of permissible coaches, or on the identity
or number of agents seeking to represent athletes turning professional, would
be regarded with extreme suspicion.
The net result of the NCAA case, then, is to deprive amateur sports of
much of its innocence. No longer will paternalistic arrangements negotiated
by leagues or associations on behalf of teams or players be regarded neutrally
by the courts. Absent a relevant statutory exemption, such as the one which
may be in effect for the Olympic sports, or the one which clearly governs
the broadcasting of many professional contests, each such arrangement will
be evaluated in terms of its potential effect on economic competition. In
the amateur sports field, this fact may generate more demands for a statutory
broadcasting exemption to the antitrust laws. Alternatively, it may lead to
new attempts to design profit-sharing or pooling arrangements which will
still meet the requirements of promoting competition. The difficulties of
establishing such arrangements are substantial, and will be addressed by Mr.
Gregory.
I now leave you to the care and the guidance of the experts whom you
have all come to listen to.

